Philosophers have traditionally conceived of actions as events which are somehow intentional. Recently, several philosophers have claimed that actions are simply causings of events. Since the view does not reference intention, some ethicists might frown. They shouldn’t. The causing view offers at least four advantages for ethical theorising. (1) It makes better sense of the means-to-end relation. For, the view neither says that means are identical to ends nor that specific ways of Φing are means of Φing (as event theorists must say). (2) It yields a very clean classification of conduct: to act is to cause a change; to omit is not to cause a change; to prevent is to cause the absence of a change; to let something happen is not to cause the absence of a change. (3) This classification is in turn helpful for the debate in ethics about doing and allowing harm. It helps analyse tricky cases of doctors unplugging patients and raises new questions about ways of bringing harm about. (4) The causing view makes questions of responsibility and agency distinct in a helpful way. It helps dispelling the illusion that the only true objects of our responsibility are our acts.

Simon-Pierre Chevarie-Cossette is the chair of practical philosophy at the University of Neuchâtel. His work, at the junction of ethics, epistemology, and action theory mainly concerns responsibility. His first book, Qu’est-ce que la responsabilité? and recent papers argue that responsibility is a duty to answer, and that blameless but responsible wrongdoing is possible. His dissertation challenges free will scepticism, in part by showing how sceptics face a problem with deliberation.